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The main purpose of this paper is to provide a critical overview of the recent empirical 
contributions that use cross-country data to study the effect of product market regulation and 
reform on a country’s macroeconomic performance.  After a brief review of the theoretical 
literature and of relevant micro-econometric evidence, the paper discusses the main data and 
methodological issues related to empirical work on this topic. It then critically evaluates the 
cross-country evidence on the effect of product market regulation on mark-ups, firm dynamics, 
investment, employment, innovation, productivity and output growth. A summary of what we 
learn from the econometric results concludes the paper. 
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  During the last 15 years many countries at different levels of development have 
introduced significant regulatory reforms of the product market, of factor markets, and of 
the financial sector. Most of the empirical literature on the effect of product and factor 
markets regulation (or regulatory reform) has focused on the labor market. Much of it has 
focused on explaining the different performance of continental European countries versus 
the United States and other OECD countries or the effect of relaxation of constraints in 
particular countries. A substantial literature has also developed on the effect of financial 
reform on a country’s real performance for both developed and developing countries. 
  The area that has been comparatively under-researched is the effect of product 
market regulation on macroeconomic outcomes, with the exception of the effect of 
barriers to trade. Yet, by now a number of contributions have appeared that have started 
redressing this imbalance and have shed light on the overall effects of product market 
regulation. The main purpose of this paper is to provide a critical overview of the recent 
empirical contributions that use cross-country data to provide insights on the effect of 
such product market regulations/reforms on a country’s macroeconomic performance.   
  We will start in Section 2 with a discussion of the main channels through which 
regulation can affect macroeconomic performance and review a few seminal micro level 
studies that are relevant for the issue under discussion. We then discuss in Section 3 the 
main characteristics of the regulatory data available and the methodological challenges 
that researchers face in assessing the effect of regulation on performance. Finally, in 
Section 4, we review the salient empirical contributions in this area. The final outcome 
measures we focus on are the demand for labor and capital, firms’ innovative activity,   3
and productivity and output growth. Intermediate outcome variables are mark-ups and 
firms’ entry, exit, and turnover rates. A summary of the main conclusions is contained in 
Section 5. 
  
2. The Effect of product market regulation on macro performance: Channels and 
related micro evidence 
 
In this section we start from a discussion of a few theoretical contributions that 
help us in understanding the complex links that exist between product market regulation 
and economic performance. We then review selectively micro-econometric studies for 
individual countries that either address the relationship between competition and 
performance or discuss the consequences of specific episodes of regulatory reform. 
 
2a. Theoretical considerations  
Product market regulation affects the overall performance of an economy in 
several ways (see Griffith and Harrison (2004)).  It has an impact on the allocation of 
resources between sectors producing different goods and between firms with different 
productivity within each sector. Moreover, it affects the productivity of existing firms. 
Finally, it has an impact on the pace of productivity growth by altering the incentives to 
innovate and by determining the speed with which new products and processes replace 
old ones.  
  When regulatory reforms lead to more competitive output markets, the wedge 
between prices and marginal costs is reduced and the allocation of goods and resources,   4
in the absence of other distortions, will become more efficient in a static sense: more 
competitive markets will allocate capital and labor more efficiently to the production of 
those goods that consumers value more.
1 Even more importantly, a more competitive 
climate will lead to pressure for the less efficient firms to exit and market shares will shift  
from  lower to higher productivity firms, leading to a more efficient allocation of factors 
of production. 
  Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) discuss the effect of product and labor market 
regulation on employment and wages in the context of a model of identical imperfectly 
competitive firms for whom labor is the only factor of production and both the product 
and labor markets are non competitive. In that model, an increase in product market 
reform is modelled either as an increase in the degree of substitutability between goods or 
as a decrease in entry cost.   
The effect of product market reform may differ between the short run and the long run. 
An increase in the degree of substitutability between goods leads in the short run, for a 
given number of firms, to lower mark-ups, increased employment and higher real wages. 
However, there is no effect in the long run, because the reduced mark-ups lead to firms’ 
exit.  Product market reforms that lead to a decrease in entry costs have, instead, long-run 
effects as well. The entry of new firms will be associated with a lower mark-up and  
higher employment and real wages. The fact that only policies that affect the cost of entry 
                                                 
1 In some situations, for instance in the presence of  natural monopolies, simple deregulation, as opposed  to 
regulatory reform, will not necessarily lead to an increase in competition and in the efficiency of resource 
allocation.   5
have long run effects, and hence are the ones that should receive the greatest attention, is 
one of the main policy implications of the paper.
2   
  Another class of models allows for heterogeneity between firms. Bernard, Eaton, 
Jenson, and Kortum (2003) and Melitz (2003) focus on external barriers affecting the 
product market and are based on the assumption of heterogeneity in productivity. These 
papers allow for entry and exit of firms and show that a lowering of trade barriers 
generates a reallocation of resources in favor of more productive firms. The exit of low 
productivity firms and the expansion in the domestic and foreign markets of higher 
productivity firms gives rise to aggregate productivity growth.
3 Bergoeing, Loayza and 
Repetto (2004) also allow for idiosyncratic heterogeneity differences in productivity and 
focus on how the effect of a negative aggregate productivity shock depends upon 
government induced rigidities in the reallocation of resources, modelled as a subsidy to 
existing firms. Simulation exercises show that the existence or the introduction of such 
subsidies increases the length of the period in which aggregate output is below potential 
and generates greater cumulated output losses.
4  
  Product market reforms also have a direct effect on the productive efficiency of 
existing firms. Greater competition may increase the incentives to reduce X- 
inefficiencies and organize work more efficiently.  The theoretical literature is immense 
and, while agency models of managerial behavior can rationalize why greater 
                                                 
2 The effect of  labor market reform, captured by a decrease in workers’ bargaining power in a Nash 
cooperative bargain, will lead to a decrease in the real wage in the short run, but to an increase in 
employment and an unchanged real wage in the long run. 
3 For recent micro evidence on foreign competition and trade reform see Pavnick (2002), Harrison and 
Revenga (1995), Harrison (1994), Levinsohn (1993). For  cross-country evidence on trade liberalization see 
Rodriguez and Rodrick (2001), Vamvakidis (2002), and Yanikkaya (2003).  
4 Cross sectional cross-country evidence supports the existence of a positive relationship between 
cumulated GDP losses and the stringency of regulation, controlling for the volatility of shocks affecting the 
economy, captured by the standard deviation of the terms of trade and of domestic inflation.    6
competition tends to reduce slack, this conclusion is by no mean unambiguous. The 
channels of transmissions are manifold (Nickell, Nicolitas, and Dryden (1997)). First, in a 
more competitive environment it may be easier for owners to monitor managers because 
there are greater opportunities for comparison which can lead to better incentives. Second, 
it is plausible that an increase in competition will increase the probability of bankruptcy 
and managers will work harder to avoid this outcome. Third, in more competitive 
markets characterized by higher demand elasticity, a reduction in costs that allows firms 
to lower prices will lead to a larger increase in demand and, potentially, profits. 
Changes in ownership from public to private may also have important effects on 
the incentives for managers and workers to reduce slack. Whether or not that happens 
crucially depends upon the market structure after privatization. One must be careful, in 
general, not to equate privatization or deregulation automatically with an increase in 
competitive pressure, particularly in sectors where increasing returns create incentives for 
the emergence of natural monopolies. 
There are several principal agent models that study the effectiveness of incentives 
and its dependence on the number of players. One of the papers that address more 
directly the link between competition and performance is the model by Hart (1983).
5 In 
that paper a fraction of firms are run by managers who respond only partially to monetary 
incentives, in the sense that they care only whether or not their income exceeds (or not) a 
minimum level. The resulting optimal contract could be to pay managers this minimum 
provided firms’ profits exceed a given floor (that can be interpreted as the bankruptcy 
level), and zero otherwise. In this situation, any shock that induces profit maximizing 
firms to reduce costs will be transmitted, via lower equilibrium prices, to non-profit 
                                                 
5 See also Holmstrom (1982), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), and Mookherjee (1984).   7
maximizing firms. Their managers will also try to reduce costs in order to avoid 
bankruptcy and preserve the utility derived from being in control of the firm. This will 
lead to an increase in the level of productivity in the economy.  
However, if we allow managers to respond to monetary incentives, the effect 
becomes ambiguous. Greater competition increases the threat of bankruptcy, which is a 
disciplining devise, but at the same time reduces profits in equilibrium, and with it, the 
possibility to provide monetary incentives to managers (Scharfstein (1988) and Schmidt 
(1997)). 
  Product market reforms may affect not only the level of productivity, but also its 
growth rate through the effect that greater competition has on the incentives to introduce 
new products or processes that replace the existing ones. The view by Schumpeter (1942) 
of growth as a process of creative destruction, in which the introduction of new processes 
and products is associated with the destruction of old ones, underlies many recent papers, 
such as the endogenous growth models of Aghion and Howitt (1992) and  Grossman and 
Helpman (1991) and  the contributions by Caballero and Hamour (1994), (1996), (1998).  
Impediments introduced by product or factor market regulations to reallocation of factors 
of production away from low return activities to high return ones may have adverse 
effects on an economy’s aggregate performance. In endogenous growth models, for 
instance, product market regulation may be seen as increasing the cost of introducing an 
innovation.    
  However, things are not so simple and there are contrasting forces at work.   In 
Schumpeter the expectations of monopoly profits provide the crucial incentive for 
innovative activity. A decrease in monopoly profits following regulatory reform may,   8
therefore, decrease the pace of innovation and therefore growth. In addition, the degree of 
market power also affects the ability to innovate since it allows the accumulation of 
internal financial resources that can be used to finance innovation. These internally 
generated funds are crucial in the presence of information asymmetries that may make it 
difficult or expensive to obtain external funds for innovation activities. Indeed in the 
early quality ladder endogenous growth models by Aghion and Howitt (1992) and 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and in the product variety model by Romer (1990) a 
reduction in rents generated by regulatory changes would adversely affect the incentive to 
innovate and, hence, decrease steady state growth.
 6  Both product variety and quality 
ladder models, moreover, typically exhibits scale effects in the sense that larger 
economies with more resources that could be devoted to research grow faster in the 
steady state.
7 In this context, product market reform in the form of trade liberalization 
could have ambiguous effects on growth, since the positive scale effect is 
counterbalanced by the (negative) effect generated by smaller rents that accrue to 
innovators. 
  Note that whereas in the product variety models the decentralized growth rate 
tends to fall short of the one chosen by the social planner, in quality ladder models of 
creative destruction this may or may not be the case, basically because the benefits of 
faster technological progress must be traded off against the losses in rents by the 
monopoly producers that are displaced.  Similar ambiguities in terms of welfare 
implications appear in models in which relationships are characterized by specificity that 
                                                 
6 Regulatory reform can be though of as increasing  the price elasticity of demand.  
7 However, minor modifications to the cost of introducing an innovation could eliminate this scale effect 
(Jones (1999)).   9
generates a hold up problem, such as Caballero and Hammour (1996), (1998). 
Regulations that make the reallocation of resources costly can lead to technological 
sclerosis, in which low productivity units are allowed to survive too long. At the same 
time, they may also cause the reallocation process to be unbalanced, in the sense that the 
destruction rate is excessive, given the low creation rate, and generates too high 
unemployment of the factor that appropriates part of the rent.   
In the earlier quality ladder growth models referred to above, innovations are 
made by outsiders and not by the incumbents. In more recent models (Aghion, Harris, 
Vickers (1997), Aghion, Harris, Howitt, Vickers (2001), Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, 
Griffith and Howitt (2002)) incumbents are allowed to innovate. In these models, the 
incentive to innovate depends upon the difference between post and pre-innovation rents. 
Greater competition reduces both, but the latter more than the former, fostering 
innovation. Basically, competition may stimulate innovation because entry and the threat 
of entry provide an incentive to innovate in order to escape competition. This effect 
should be stronger in industries where competition occurs between “neck-and-neck” 
firms, i.e. firms with similar production costs. In other terms, competition is more likely 
to stimulate innovation and productivity growth in sectors or countries close to the 
technological frontier, while the opposite holds for sectors or countries below the frontier. 
Finally, there can also be another channel through which increased competition 
can have a beneficial effect on innovation and growth. When principal agent 
considerations such as those in Hart  (1983) are  inserted in an endogenous growth model,  
greater competitive pressure can provide an incentive for managers to speed up the   10
adoption of new technologies  in order to avoid bankruptcy and the loss of benefits from 
control associated with it (see Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1999)).  
In summary, there are many ways through which product market regulation may 
have an impact on overall economic performance. Regulatory reform can affect allocative 
efficiency, the extent of managerial slack, and X-inefficiency in existing firms. Moreover, 
it can exert an influence on the process of firm dynamics and on the introduction of new 
products, and hence on aggregate productivity growth.  However, at the theoretical level 
there are sufficient ambiguities or caveats concerning the direction of the effect that 
empirical research in this area is absolutely essential to come to a convincing conclusion 
about the overall impact of product market regulation. 
 
2b. Lessons from micro-econometric evidence 
  A seminal micro-econometric contribution that has important implications for the 
issues we are discussing here is the paper by Nickell (1996), who uses firm level data for 
the UK to investigate where changes in competition affect productivity levels and growth 
rates. Competition is measured in several ways, including measures of monopoly rents, 
concentration, import penetration, and number of competitors. By estimating a dynamic 
production function with the competition variables as additional regressors, and allowing 
for endogeneity of input choices, Nickell finds that greater competition has a positive 
effect both on the level and the growth of productivity. Note that while firm level 
variables are instrumented in the context of a dynamic panel GMM approach, 
competition variables are not. However, if an increase in productivity leads a firm to 
increase its market share, so that the market becomes more concentrated and less   11
competitive, this would impart a downward bias to the estimates of the effect of 
competition on productivity. In this case, the estimated effect represents a lower bound 
on the true effect of competition on productivity.  
  The results in Nickell are confirmed by the more recent contribution by Disney, 
Haskel, and Heden (2000), using a larger data set for UK firms.
8 Klette (1999) extends 
the approach by Hall (1986), (1988) to estimate market power and concludes, using 
Norwegian plant level data, that plants characterized by greater market power tend to be 
less productive. Bottasso and Sembenelli (2001) apply a similar methodology on Italian 
firm level data and conclude that the EU Single Market Program has led to a decrease in 
the mark-up and an increase in productivity for those firms that were expected, ex-ante, 
to be more sensitive to the abolition of external barriers. There are several other micro-
econometric contributions that address the effect of regulatory reform and privatization 
on productive efficiency or productivity growth. Many of these studies focus on the 
service sector since regulatory changes have been particularly important in utilities, 
communication, and in the transport sector. We will not review in detail the evidence 
here, but the overall conclusion is that in many instances there have been productivity 
gains due to the increased competition.
 9 
  An important paper on the effect of regulatory reform on the dynamics of 
productivity is the one by Olley and Pakes (1996) on the evolution of the US 
                                                 
8 See also Jaganathan and Srinivassan (2000) for a different way of testing the effect of competition on 
agency problems, based on the relationship between leverage and profits. 
 
9 For evidence on the effect of the EU Single Market Program on mark-ups and productivity see also, 
Gagnepain and Marin Uribe (2003), Goldberg and Verboven. (2001) among others. See also Martins, 
Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) on mark-ups in the OECD. For a review see  Ahn (2002), pp. 17-18, Ahn (2001), 
pp. 24-25, and Faini et al. (2005). 
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telecommunication industry following deregulation. The industry experienced 
productivity growth that was not reflective of productivity growth in manufacturing. 
Olley and Pakes use their estimate of production function parameters that control for 
endogeneity and sample selection to show that improved performance is due to a 
reallocation of capital to more productive plants. It is the reallocation of output to more 
productive plants and not an increase in average productivity growth that is behind the 
increase in productivity at the industry level.  
  There is indeed considerable debate on the relative importance for aggregate 
productivity growth of the “within” component (coming from productivity improvement 
in continuing firms), of the “between” component (due to the reallocation of resources 
between continuing firms), and of the component due to  entry/exit.
10 Note that changes 
in product market regulation that reduce entry barriers will have an effect on all 
components. Results on total productivity growth decompositions differ according to the 
precise formula used, according to whether one focuses on multi-factor or labor 
productivity, whether one uses employment or product weights, whether they are 
beginning of period or an average between the beginning and the end of period, and 
according to the length of the horizon chosen for the calculation. Many estimates of the 
within component of labor productivity imply that it is the most important component, 
although its weight varies across studies. Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (1998) show 
that the contribution of net entry to aggregate productivity becomes important (and 
positive) only at a 5/10 year horizon, reflecting the increasing share of entering/exiting 
firms and learning/selection effects. Evidence on the importance of reallocation of market 
                                                 
10 See Haltiwanger (2000) and Ahn (2001) for a review. In some decompositions, in addition to the 
“within”, “between” and entry/exit component s there is also a “cross” component.    13
shares from low to high productivity firms is also mixed. For instance Grilliches and 
Regev (1995), and Scarpetta, Hemmings, Tressel and Woo (2002) find that it is small, 
whereas Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992), and Foster et al. (1998) find it is important. 
There is little evidence on the effect of regulatory changes in the product market 
on productivity growth and other outcomes in developing countries.
11  An exception is 
Srivastava (1996) who analyzes the effect of the first phase of industrial deregulation in 
India in 1985, involving a significant degree of  de-licensing  of entry and expansion and 
liberalization of intermediate and capital imports. Using production function estimates 
based on firm level panel data, he shows that the rate of TFP growth for existing firms 
increased after deregulation. The increase was particularly evident in those sectors with 
an above average use of imported materials. More recently, Aghion, Burgess, Redding, 
and Zilibotti (2005), using a panel of industry/state level data, provide evidence that de-
regulating entry in India in 1985 and 1991 has not had an identifiable effect on entry, but 
it has increased the dispersion of output levels across establishments. Moreover, they 
show that output increases more after product market deregulation if labor market 
regulation is less restrictive. The interaction between product and labor market reform is 
an important issue that deserves further investigation. 
  The empirical results concerning the relationship between innovation and 
competition are mixed.
12 Most studies, particularly the earlier ones, were conducted at the 
industry level and they tended to rely on concentration as a measure of competition, 
which is problematic because the measure of concentration does not capture the 
                                                 
11 . See Heckman and Pages (2003) on the effect of labor market regulation in Latin America. See also 
Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler, and Kugler (2005) for evidence on the effect of  factor market reform on 
employment  adjustment, capital adjustment and productivity using a panel of plants in Columbia.   
12 See Ahn (2002) for a review. See also Geroski (1995)   14
competitive pressure coming from potential entrants. The overall results are not 
supportive of the proposition that concentration exerts an unambiguous positive effect on 
innovation activities.
13  
  More recently, Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999) found, using UK firm 
level data, that firms with greater market share were more innovative, but that more 
competitive industries produced more innovation. Recent firm level evidence suggests 
that the relationship between mark-ups and innovation is non linear and has an inverted U 
shape, as suggested by the most recent growth models. Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith 
and Howitt (2005) use data on listed UK firms for which weighted patents measures of 
innovation are available. The Lerner index is used as a measure of competition and the 
problem of its endogeneity is addressed by using as instruments reforms linked to the EU 
single market, reforms imposed on individual sectors as a result of action by the UK 
competition authorities, and measures of privatization.  The results are supportive of an 
inverted U shape relationship with innovations being adversely affected by a very 
competitive or very monopolistic environment.  Note that a linear specification would 
yield a positive relationship between innovation and measures of rents, as suggested by 
Schumpeter. The results are stronger in neck-and-neck industries, as suggested by the 
theory. 
  Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt, and Prantl (2005) analyze the effect of foreign 
firm entry on TFP growth and patent counts. Obviously, entry is endogenous and the 
latter is instrumented with policy and foreign technology variables that are less likely to 
have a direct effect on the growth of TFP or on patents. Using individual UK firm data, 
entry is found to have a positive, significant and sizeable effect on TFP. The effect is 
                                                 
13 See Cohen and Levin (1989).   15
greater when IV procedures are used and it is greater for an industry closer to the 
technological frontier. 
  
3. Data and methodological issues  
  
  In this section, we will review the main data on regulation that are available 
across countries and that have been used in empirical work. We will also discuss the main 
stylized fact that can be identified from the data. The available measures of regulation 
condition the type of econometric evidence that can be produced, and often it represents 
an important constraint for the researcher. Although there are serious issues in measuring 
economic outcomes, such as total factor productivity growth or firm’s innovative 
activities, they are arguably not as severe as those affecting the measurement of tightness 
of  regulation.
14  
  We also discuss other important methodological issues involved in estimating the 
effect of regulation on economic activity. The main issue here is to go beyond any 
observed statistical association between regulation and performance and draw inferences 
on the causal effect of regulation on economic outcomes.  
  
3a. Data and stylized facts 
  Product market regulation varies by countries and time and often is industry 
specific. Moreover, the term “product market regulation” encompasses various 
dimensions that exert different effects on agents’ behavior. Perhaps the most important 
aspect one would like to capture is how regulation contributes, directly or indirectly, to 
                                                 
14 See for instance Basu and Kimball (1997) on the problems in measuring productivity growth.   16
the size of entry barriers. However, there are conceptual and practical problems in 
measuring those dimensions of regulation that are relevant in this respect. Moreover, 
often the data are not available at the industry-country level, but only at the country level, 
and/or they are available at only one point in time or at widely spaced intervals. 
  One of the main data sets used in empirical work is collected by the Fraser 
Institute and it contains information (in the interval 1 to 10, decreasing with stringency of 
regulation) on price controls, time spent with bureaucracy, ease of starting a new business, 
government transfers and subsidies (as a % of GDP), government enterprises and 
government investment (as a % of GDP), non-tariff import barriers, and average tariffs.  
The indicators reflect a mixture of factual information and perception and are available 
up to 2000 at five year intervals. After that, they are available at a yearly frequency. No 
sectoral disaggregation of the indices is available. 
  Another useful data set is the OECD database on regulatory reforms containing 
detailed economy wide information for 1998 and 2003 on regulations and administrative 
burdens on existing and new business.
15 For a subset of industries (in the general utility, 
communication and transport sectors) indices of the importance of barriers to entry, 
vertical integration, market structure, price controls, and of the importance of public 
ownership are available on an annual basis from 1975 to 2003 (the indices range from 0 
to 6 and are increasing with the stringency of regulation).
16 For these sectors, the data 
availability comes as close as possible to what a researcher would want. Sectoral 
indicators are available for 1998 and 2003 for retail trade and professional services. For 
manufacturing, no time varying data are available at an annual frequency, except data on 
                                                 
15 See Nicoletti and Pryor (2005) for evidence that the OECD economy-wide indicators and the Fraser 
Institute indicators are highly correlated, in spite of the different methodology used in their construction. 
16 See Nicoletti, Bassanini, Ernst, Jean, Santiago, and Swaim (2001), and Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003).   17
tariff and non tariff barriers, public ownership, and restrictions on foreign direct 
investment. 
  For European countries, one can also obtain further information on the evolution 
of state intervention in the economy, using the Eurostat  data on sectoral and ad hoc state 
aid (% of GDP), public procurement (as % of GDP), and openly advertised public 
procurement (% of procurement) for the nineties. Another useful source of data is the 
European Centre for Public Enterprises with Public Participation (CEEP) that provides 
information on the share of public enterprises in the business sector at 4/5 year intervals. 
  As we have seen, there is greater data availability on various aspects of product 
market regulation for developed countries. An important source of information that 
covers developing countries and transition economies as well is the World Bank  “Doing 
Business” database. It contains information on the ease of starting a new business, 
including the number of procedures, the time involved, and their cost. The data set is 
based in part on, and expands, the design in Djankov, La Porta, Lopes de Silanes, and  
Shleifer (2000). It also provides useful information on other dimensions of  the business 
environment, such as dealing with licenses, hiring and firing workers, closing a business, 
paying taxes, etc. Unfortunately these indices are available only for the period 1996- 
2002 at a biannual frequency, and lack industry details.  
  What are the main stylized facts about product market regulation that can be 
identified from the data sets we have described? First, regulatory burdens vary widely 
across the world. In particular, regulation tends to be more stringent in poor countries 
compared with richer countries. There is also evidence that it is greater in countries with 
a French legal origin or with a socialist legal origin. Second, the dispersion of regulatory   18
regimes is greater in developing countries relative to developed countries. Third, there 
has been a generalized tendency towards the relaxation of regulation concerning entry. 
This has been accompanied by a decrease over time in tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
trade in manufacturing. Fourth, OECD countries have experienced substantial 
deregulation in services, in sectors such as telecommunication, utilities, and transport. 
The timing and extent of regulatory reform has varied considerably, with the US, the UK, 
and New Zealand moving earlier and more decisively compared to countries such as 
France, Italy and Greece. Finally, often regulatory reform has been accompanied by 
privatization, so that there has been a tendency for the share of output produced by public 
enterprises to decrease. 
 
3b. Methodological issues 
  The main methodological issue facing researchers working in this area is to go 
beyond any observed statistical association between regulation and performance and 
draw inferences on the effect of regulation on economic outcomes.  In doing so, it is 
important to control for observed and unobserved factors that have an effect on 
performance independently from the regulatory environment. Most papers make a serious 
effort in controlling for observed factors. The main issue involves unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
  If outcomes are measured at the industry level and the type, level and change in 
regulation is also industry specific, the availability of time varying industry specific 
indicators allows one to control for time invariant country and industry effects. It can also 
allow one to control for factors that vary over time and are common across sectors, like   19
technological innovations or knowledge that are widely accessible by all countries or 
common macro shocks. If the time varying information on regulation is only country 
specific, but there continues to be time varying industry specificity in regulation, the 
measurement error problem may bias the coefficient on regulation towards zero and make 
it more difficult to detect the true effect of regulatory changes. At a minimum, it would 
be desirable to distinguish between regulation in manufacturing and in service industries. 
Yet, in the case that common regulatory changes are dominant, time varying indices at 
the country level are useful in that one can control, at least, for country and sector 
specific time invariant characteristics.  
  If the time dimension is not available, industry variation in the product market 
regulation indicators is still helpful, because, at least one can control for additive 
unobserved country and industry specific effects ( but not for country specific industry 
effects). All the identification in this case comes from cross-sectional country/sector 
variation in the data.   
  However, often one has available information that varies only by country, with no 
industry specificity. This makes it very hard to distinguish the effect of product market 
regulation from other country specific unobservable effects. In assessing a country’s 
aggregate performance, some mileage here can be gained by using interaction effects 
with other variables that vary by country and time. For instance, one may believe that the 
effect of regulation may be different depending upon circumstances such as distance of a 
country from the technological frontier, etc. The lack of identification of the main effect 
of regulation from other country specific effects remains.    20
  A distinct, and less relevant problem in this area of research, occurs when one 
only has country specific information on regulation even if the latter is truly the only one 
that matters because there is no industry specificity, yet one uses outcomes at the industry 
level as a dependent variable. Moulton (1990) points out that standard errors for the 
coefficient of the variable (regulation) that varies only by country can be seriously 
underestimated when the error terms are contemporaneously correlated across industries 
within countries. The severity of the problem and the appropriate solutions is related, 
among other things, to the number of groups (countries in our context). If the number of 
groups is large, things are simpler, although one has to take into account the potential 
contemporaneous correlation in the error term across sectors within a country. Things are 
more complicated if the number of groups is small (see Wooldridge (2003) for an 
overview).  
  Another, more important, issue is the potential endogeneity of regulation itself, 
even if one controls for country and industry time invariant effects.  Regulation may 
indeed reflect the economic performance of a country or of an industry. It is difficult to 
say a priori in which direction the bias would work. For instance, negative macro shocks, 
particularly if prolonged, can enhance the probability of reforms because the 
unsatisfactory nature of the status quo weakens opposition to reform. However, it may be 
easier to introduce reform in good times because their negative impact on particular 
groups may be smaller and/or there are more resources to compensate the losers. In the 
first case, OLS or Within estimators may lead to an underestimate of the true effect of 
reform, in the latter case, such effects will be overestimated. Recent empirical evidence 
for OECD countries suggests that poor growth experience in a given year (or in the recent   21
past) leads to less regulated output markets.
17 Similar results hold for trade reform, but, 
interestingly, not for financial or labor market reform.
18 No systematic evidence is 
available for developing countries, although it is not unreasonable to conjecture that 
similar patterns may be observed for product market and trade regulation. The result of 
all this is that there is the risk of underestimating the effect of  product market reforms, 
since the outcome variables one is interested in are generally procyclical, including 
standard measure of productivity. 
  
4. Product Market Regulation and Economic Performance: Review of Cross-
country Evidence  
 
  In this section, we will review a set of recent contributions that have a direct 
bearing on the effect of product market regulation on various aspects of macroeconomic 
performance. The review will be selective and focus on papers that provide cross-country 
evidence.  In many cases, researchers have adopted a reduced form approach and have 
entered measures of regulation as an explanatory variable in equations for factor demand, 
productivity or innovation. In other cases, the effect of regulation is mediated through its 
effect on an intermediate variable, such as the mark-up or firms’ entry, exit, and turnover 
rates. We will start from reviewing the evidence on the effect of regulation on these 
“intermediate” variables, and we will then discuss the effect of regulation on the ultimate 
outcome variables, such as investment, employment, innovation, productivity, and output 
growth. 
                                                 
17 See IMF economic Outlook, 2004, ch. III “Fostering Structural Reforms in Industrial Countries”.  
18 A contemporaneous bad year increases labor market regulation and past weak growth is associated with 
tighter financial regulation.   22
 
4a. Transmission mechanism: Effect on mark-up and  firms’ entry/exit/turnover 
  Griffith and Harrison (2004) is a good example of the two step strategy. In the 
first step, they first estimate the effect of product market reforms on the level of rents, 
measured by the ratio between value added and the sum of labor and capital costs. The 
effect of variations in the mark-up on factor accumulation R&D and productivity is 
estimated next, using product market reforms as an instrument for the clearly endogenous 
mark-up. The implicit assumption is that product market reforms affects the economy 
only through mark-up variations and not directly. They only use regulations that vary 
with time across countries in order to be able to control for cross- sectional unobservable 
differences that are relatively constant over time. The indicators of product market 
regulation are the Fraser Institute index of ease of starting a new business, of price 
controls, of time spent with government bureaucracy, average tariff rates, of regulatory 
trade barriers, the European Center of Enterprises with Public Participation, and the 
Eurostat Structural indicators on state aid, on public procurement, and on the percentage 
of it that is publicly advertised. The indicators are interpolated or extrapolated if not 
available for each year and are entered separately in the equations. Both in the mark-up 
and factor demand equation they control for country specific cyclical factors. Their 
results suggest that many of the indicators measuring tightness of regulation have a 
significant positive effect on mark-ups, as one would expect. The effect of variations of 
mark-ups on various economic outcomes will be discussed below. 
Several authors extend and modify the two step approach found in Griffith and 
Harrison (2004), by choosing a different intermediate variable to focus on. Cincera and   23
Galgau (2005) estimate first the effect of regulation on entry and exit of new firms and 
then the effect of entry and exit on factor demand and productivity. Loayza, Oviedo and 
Serven (2005) use firm turnover rates (the number of exiting and entering firms divided 
by the total number of firms) as the intermediate variable and investigate its effect on 
productivity growth and its components. Scarpetta, Hemmings, Tressel and Woo (2002), 
Brandt (2004) and  Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2004) present results on the effect of 
regulation on entry, but do not  investigate the relationship between entry and other 
economic outcomes. 
 Data sources for entry and exit rate vary across studies. The entry and exit rate 
variables in Cincera and Galgau (2005) are taken from the DUN & BRADSTREET data 
base on the number of entries and exits for 352 digits sectors for 9 OECD countries. The 
data on firm dynamics in Loayza et al. cover  six Latin American countries and nine 
industrial economies and are taken from the harmonized data set on firm dynamics 
constructed by Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2004). The entry and exit rates in 
Scarpetta et al. and Brandt are taken, instead, from the OECD firm level data base 
constructed from business registers or social security databases. Klapper et al. (2004) use 
the cross-country firm level Amadeus data set to construct entry rates for Western and 
Eastern European countries.  In most cases the time dimension of the data on entry and 
exit tends to be rather short.
19 
The results obtained by Cincera and Galgau, using the first principal component 
of the Fraser Institute and the within estimator, suggest that deregulation tends to be 
                                                 
19  For instance, the data for firm demographic refer to the period 1997-2003 for most countries in Cincera 
(2004), and to 1998 and 1999 in Klapper et al. (2004).  In Loayza et al (2005) the period is somewhat 
longer (1990-2001) for some countries, but not for others.   24
significantly associated  with more entry and exit.
20  When the coefficient on regulation is 
allowed to differ across sectors the results are not tidy, with the sign and significance 
varying across sectors. Similarly, allowing for country variations, suggest heterogeneity 
of responses that are not easy to rationalize.  
Scarpetta et al. (2002) use as explanatory variable, the time invariant OECD 
indicators, either country or country/sector specific. When only country level indicators 
are used, one obviously cannot control for country specific effects. When 
industry/country specific indices are used, the authors control for country and industry 
additive effects. The more convincing results are those in which they control for country 
and sector effects in the specification also including employment protection indices. 
Product and  labor market regulations indices are interacted with firm size dummies. 
There is evidence that for firms from 20 to 99 workers product market regulation has a 
negative and significant effect on entry. For the 100 to 499 class the effect is positive and 
significant, which is somewhat puzzling.  
The results by Brandt (2004) are obtained using country specific time invariant 
measures of  barriers to entrepreneurship as the explanatory variable in an equation in 
which the dependent variable is the averaged residual (across sectors and time) of a 
regression of entry rate on industry, time dummies, and country specific ICT industries 
dummies. The focus on barrier to entry is motivated by the fact that some of its 
subcomponents are the only ones to have some explanatory power. This is not true for 
indicators summarizing state control and barriers to trade and investment. The barriers to 
                                                 
20 In the estimating equation, the author controls for lagged entry, capital and R&D intensity as a measure 
of barrier to entry, and other market structure variables, as a measure of opportunities, in addition to year, 
country and sector effects. Note that the use of the within estimator even in a dynamic equation with short 
T is not appropriate.   25
entry coefficient is not significant, however there is some evidence that its subcomponent 
representing regulatory and administrative opacity has some explanatory power for entry 
rates.  
Klapper et al. (2004) focuses on the interaction effect between regulation and the 
“normal” rate of entry in an industry, proxied by the corresponding entry or turnover rate 
for the US. The drawback is that one cannot make a statement about the overall effect of 
regulation on entry, but only on relative magnitudes. The advantage is that this approach 
should be less affected by reversed causality problems, whereas in countries with 
generally low entry there may be less pressure to eliminate restrictive regulations.  The 
results suggest that regulation reduces entry relative to the “normal” industry specific rate 
one observes in a country (the US) with low barriers to entry.
 21 
Loayza et al. (2005) emphasizes that the extent of firm dynamics depends also 
upon the volatility of the shocks affecting each country. In particular, they include in the 
equations for entry, exit and turnover the triple interaction between regulation, normal 
turnover (in the US), and the standard deviation of terms of trade growth. In this case, the 
question is whether economies react differently to shocks depending upon the nature of 
each sector and the nature of country level regulation.
 22  The evidence is supportive of 
the idea that product market regulation slows down the reallocation of resources 
following a shock. 
                                                 
21 Klapper  et al. use the time invariant measures on barrier to entry in Diankov et al. (2002). The equations 
contain also country, industry, size and year effects. In one specification regulation is instrumented by 
country of origin, with no fundamental change to the results. 
22 Loayza et al. construct a time invariant summary measure of regulation based on information from the 
World Bank, the Heritage Foundation, and the Fraser Institute. The statistics  for firm demographic cover 
the period  1990-2001, while productivity refers to the 1988-200 period. The equations contain also country, 
industry, size and year effects. The paper also studies the effect of  labor market regulation and  fiscal 
burden.   26
Considering all the empirical contributions on the relationship between regulation 
and firm dynamics together leads to the conclusion that regulatory barriers in the product 
market have a negative effect on firm’s entry or turnover and are likely to slow the 
process of reallocation of resources.  
 
4b. Effect of product market regulation (PMR) on fixed capital and labor demand 
  Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti, Schiantarelli (2005) uses country/sector time varying 
information on regulation to assess its effect on capital accumulation by introducing 
regulation indicators directly in an investment equation. Understanding the behavior of 
investment is very important for many reasons, including the fact that often process 
innovations are embodied in new capital goods. The theoretical model that underlies their 
contribution is an extension of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) that assumes perfectly 
competitive labor markets but introduces capital as a factor of production that is costly to 
adjust. Product market regulation affects the size of the mark-up by altering, for instance, 
entry barriers. Moreover regulation can influence the cost that even existing firms face 
when expanding their capital stock.
23 Regulatory reform that generates a decrease of the 
mark-up or in the cost of adjusting capital is shown to lead to an increased demand for 
capital. There may be however contrary forces at work. For instance, regulation may 
impose a ceiling in certain sectors on the rate of return.  If such a ceiling is binding, a 
removal of the constraint may reduce the demand for capital. Moreover, deregulation has 
sometimes been accompanied by privatization. The reduced importance of a dominant 
publicly owned player facing a soft budget constraint is equivalent to a reduction in entry 
barriers. However, public enterprises may have been heavy investors, either because of a 
                                                 
23 The model allows for quadratic adjustment costs in capital.   27
political mandate imposed of them or because of their incentives to over expand either 
because they are empire builders or because they want to maximize political support. 
  In their empirical work Alesina et al. focus on investment in non manufacturing 
industries  (utilities, communications and transport) in OECD countries that have 
experienced profound changes, particularly in the 1990’s, in their regulatory framework. 
They use time varying sector-country  specific measures of regulation collected by the 
OECD for the period 1975-1998.  In their investment equation, they allow for a sector-
country specific fixed effect and, in some specification, for a sector specific time trend. 
This is very important because one needs to control for those sector specific 
technological shocks that were occurring at the time of regulatory reform and to which 
reform itself may be responding.  
  The overall results suggest that a reduction in regulation, particularly if it affects 
barriers to entry, has a significant and sizeable positive effect on investment. The results 
are robust with respect to the inclusion of several country or sector specific controls and 
to estimating the model in difference by GMM, where the regulatory index is also 
instrumented with lagged values of itself, with population, GDP per capita, cumulative 
years of left wing government, and union density (see Djankov et al (2002) on the 
determinants of regulation). When the specification also includes measures of public 
ownership, the effect of a reduction in entry barriers remains significant. The coefficient 
of indices of public ownership is also significant, and its sign suggest that privatization 
has a positive effect on investment. Finally, there is evidence of non linearities in the 
sense that more decisive and deeper deregulations have a greater marginal impact. Note 
that the positive effect of deregulation on investment not only reflects a static reallocation   28
of resources, but may also have growth effects, if new technologies are embodied in new 
capital goods. 
Evidence on factor demand is also provided, using the two step approach by 
Griffith and Harrison (2004), via the mark-up, and by Cincera and Galgau (2005), via 
entry. After showing that a decrease in regulation leads to a significant decrease in the 
mark-up,  the results in Griffith and Harrison suggest that the mark-up is negatively and 
significantly related to employment and investment (see below in 4d for the effect on 
R&D and productivity). However, in both cases the test of over-identifying restriction 
strongly rejects the model, meaning that some of the regulation indicators have a direct 
effect on employment and investment, besides having an effect through the mark-up. 
Taking account also of their direct effect leads to the conclusion that  the more important 
effect on labor and investment comes from the average tariff rate (negative), from price 
controls (negative), and from the CEEP measure of the importance of  public enterprises 
(negative). Re-estimation of the employment and investment model reveals that services 
are responsible for the conclusion that an increase in competition stimulates factor 
demand, while this is not true for manufacturing. 
Cincera and Galgau (2005) use firm entry and exit rates as the intermediate 
variable through which regulation affects various aspects of performance. Obviously, the 
entry and exit rates are endogenous and need instrumenting.
24 The instrument chosen by 
Cincera  and Galgau are current and lagged values of the first principal component of the 
Fraser indices and an index of restrictions on FDI investment, which vary only by 
country and account only for a portion of the industry level variation of entry. For this 
                                                 
24 Brandt (2004) also present correlation between entry and measures of economic performance, but given 
the endogeneity problem, it is difficult what to make of them.    29
reason, current and lagged values of the number of active, entering, and exiting firms are 
used as additional instruments, which is a more questionable choice. Lack of rejection by 
the Sargan test of  the over-identifying restrictions is not reassuring. If anything, it 
reminds us of the low power of the test in many circumstances, particularly when many 
of the instruments have a low explanatory power in the first stage regression.  Be that as 
it may, the results suggest  that entry  is not a significant determinant of  the growth in 
investment, while exit is associated with a significant decrease in the pace of capital 
accumulation. For employment growth, the effect is not significant or of different sign at 
different lag lengths of entry, but with a close to zero net effect.  
Summarizing, the direct evidence in Alesina et al. (2004) and the indirect one, via 
effects on the mark-up in Griffith et al (2004) suggest a positive effect of deregulation on 
investment and employment in the service sector. For manufacturing, there is no evidence 
of a positive (or for that matter, negative) effect. The results in Cincera and Galgau (2005) 
suggest that entry is not a key channel of transmission of  regulatory changes to the 
reallocation of labor and capital. 
 
4c. Effect of  PMR on innovation 
  Bassanini and Ernst  (2002) present  direct evidence for  18 manufacturing 
industries in 18 OECD countries on the effect of  product and labor market regulation on 
R&D intensity (relative to output). R&D is used as an input based measure of  innovative 
activities by a firm. The advantage of  this measure is the fact that it is more easily 
available than other measures such as patent counts. The drawback is that R&D is not the 
only input in the innovation process and, even if it were, R&D intensity may not capture   30
changes in its effectiveness. Finally, not all innovative efforts are measured by formal 
R&D spending. The regulation variables are the OECD country level time invariant 
measures of domestic economic regulation (state control, legal barriers to entry, price 
controls) and administrative regulation (administrative barriers for new firms, permit and 
licensing systems), in addition to time varying indicators of tariffs and non- tariff barriers. 
A measure of protection of intellectual property rights is also included. Controls include 
industry and country dummies in addition to employment share of large firms and import 
penetration. As a result, the main effect of the time invariant indices of regulation cannot 
be estimated, only its differential impact across some cut in the data (high tech versus low 
tech industries in this case). 
  The results suggest that non-tariff barriers have a negative effect on R&D 
intensity. No effect of tariff barriers is detected, although one wonders whether the 
presence of the import penetration variable as a regressor or the lack of variation of this 
indicator across EU countries may be responsible for this result. There is no evidence of a 
differential effect of  domestic or administrative barriers comparing low tech to high tech 
firms. In contrast, there is a positive differential effect for employment protection in high 
tech industries relative to low tech in centralized systems of industrial relations. Note 
however that the high tech-centralized IR system interaction has a negative coefficient. 
  Griffith and Harrison (2004) analyze also the effect of  (time varying) product 
market regulation on R&D  through changes in the mark-up. Even allowing for a 
quadratic term, for virtually all countries the mark-up has a positive and significant effect 
on R&D. Also, in this case, the test of over-identifying restrictions suggests that some of 
the indicators should be included directly in the equation. The results suggest that a lower   31
tariff rate, fewer barriers to starting a business, and lower regulatory trade barriers are 
associated with lower R&D in the business sector. The results obtained for the 
manufacturing sector are similar. However, they are very sensitive to the inclusion of 
Finland in the sample. When Finland is excluded, one obtains a strong inverted U shaped 
relationship between R&D spending and the mark-up, with some countries such as 
France, Italy and the Netherlands mostly on the downward sloping section. The 
sensitivity of the results to country sample selection deserves to be investigated further.
25  
  Cincera and Galgau (2005) finds a negative effect of entry on R&D intensity that 
is significant at the 10% level. Recall that entry is negatively related to the tightness of 
regulation. The effect on the R&D spending growth rate is significantly positive 
contemporaneously and negative after one year. The net effect is close to zero. 
  Summing up, the cross-country studies are not supportive of a strong positive 
effect of lower regulation on direct input measures of firms’ innovative activities. 
Actually, the evidence suggests that lower mark-ups associated with product market 
reform lead to lower R&D for most countries. However, this evidence is sensitive in 
manufacturing to the particular sample of countries selected for estimation. 
 
4d. Effect of PMR on productivity and output growth 
  There are several papers that address the relationship between product market 
regulation and productivity or output growth. In an early contribution, Koediik and 
Kremers (1996) find a negative cross sectional relationship between per capita GDP 
growth or TFP growth and product market regulation in 11 European countries. More 
                                                 
25 Very recent empirical work conducted at the Institute for Fiscal Studies and still in a draft stage confirms 
that the inclusion or exclusion of  Scandinavian countries affects deeply the shape of the relationship 
between the mark-up and innovation. I thank R. Griffith for useful comments and information on this point.    32
recently, using the economic freedom index published by the Fraser Institute and 
averaging data over five year periods, Card and Freeman (2004)  fail to find a significant 
effect of regulation on the level of output per capita (or per worker) or on its growth rate, 
once they control for year and country effects
26.  
  Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) provide perhaps the more detailed empirical 
contribution on this issue. They focus on the effect of  regulation on total factor 
productivity levels, using cross-country data for several industrial sectors and including 
the regulatory variable directly in the productivity equation. Their approach is inspired by 
the contribution by Griffith, Redding, and Van Reenen (2004), (2003) who use an 
endogenous growth model to rationalize both a direct effect of R&D on growth through 
its effect on innovation creation, and an indirect one through the absorption of new 
technology. The importance of the indirect one depends positively upon the distance from 
the world frontier of each industry. The authors substitute R&D with their measure of 
product market regulation and also allow for a direct and indirect effect.
27  
  The productivity measure is calculated for 17 manufacturing and 6 service 
industries for 18 OECD countries. Three sets of results are presented. In the first one the 
authors use the wide coverage, but time invariant country level measures of liberalization 
collected by the OECD in 1998 (which is towards the end of their sample period). The 
regulation variables are not significant on their own in regressions that do not (cannot) 
include a country effect.  They are significant when interacted with the technology gap in 
an equation that lacks country effect. The latter could have been used instead of the 
                                                 
26 The only significant effect is on employment growth. 
27 Note that the results for the effect of regulation on productivity in Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) 
subsume and extend the ones in Scarpetta , Hemming, Tressel and Woo (2002). 
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insignificant time invariant indicators, in order to make a more robust statement about the 
significance of the differential effect of regulation, depending upon the technology gap. 
The time invariant character of the indicators precludes an assessment of the significance 
of the total effect that is robust to unobserved country heterogeneity. 
  The time varying measures of privatisation are introduced on their own and they 
tend to have a positive and significant effect on productivity growth. When a time 
varying measure of liberalization based on information in seven service sectors is 
introduced, the privatization index becomes not significant, while the time varying 
measure of regulation is significant and positive. The problem here is whether the 
regulatory reforms for the service sector can be used for the economy as a whole. 
  In another set of results, a time varying measure of entry liberalization in 
manufacturing, based on data on trade liberalization, is used in conjunction with the time 
varying measure of liberalization in  the service sector. In that case, basically no 
significant direct or indirect effect can be detected. Only when liberalization in 
manufacturing is redefined  as the average of  trade liberalization and entry liberalization 
in non manufacturing, one observes a significant direct positive effect of  deregulation on 
TFP growth. 
  Finally, the 1998 time invariant sector specific OECD measures of liberalization 
are combined with the time varying measure of liberalization for manufacturing and for 
services. The equations contain country, industry, and year dummies. The results suggest 
that entry liberalization in services has a positive effect on productivity growth. The only 
significant interaction is the one between entry liberalization in manufacturing and the   34
technology gap. Privatization continues to have a positive direct effect on productivity 
growth. 
  Summarizing, there seems to be some evidence of a positive effect of 
privatization and entry liberalization on TFP growth. There is also evidence that entry 
barriers in manufacturing may affect the pace of technology absorption, especially for 
countries that lie away from the world frontier. 
  Additional evidence on the effect of  regulation on per-capita GDP growth  for 
industrial countries is contained in chapter III of  the IMF World Economic Outlook 
(2004), while Loayza, Oviedo,  and Serven (2004) is one of the very few papers that 
looks at the effect of regulation on the economic performance of a wide set of countries, 
including developing countries. The IMF study concentrates on 15 developed countries  
with a maximum of  five observations on growth rates calculated over three-year 
averages. The estimated equation contains standard controls for cross-country growth 
regressions and a menu of structural policy indicators, including (present and lagged) 
values of the time varying average product market regulation indicator developed by the 
OECD for seven non-manufacturing sectors, and average effective tax rates. The sample 
size is therefore small and the product market regulation indicator captures only a subset 
of the economy. The model is estimated by GMM dynamic panel data methods and 
suggests that both product market reform and trade reform have a positive and significant 
effect on growth, although it may take time for the full effects to be realized. 
  The main challenge when dealing with developing countries is the availability of 
detailed indices of product market regulation that reflect the cross sectional and time 
variability of product market regulation, although some of them, such as tariff barriers,   35
are available at annual frequency and the indices of the Fraser Institute at five year 
intervals  for many countries. The Loayza et al (2004) paper focuses on time invariant 
indices constructed from information from the World Bank, the Heritage Foundation, and 
the Fraser Institute and are meant to capture the fiscal burden, and product market 
regulation, the latter a composite of entry, trade, financial markets, bankruptcy, and 
contract enforcement indices.  An index of labor market regulation is also constructed. 
  The indices are used as regressors in standard cross sectional average growth 
regressions for output per capita over the 1990’s, allowing their effect to depend on an 
index of the quality of governance. Their effect on output volatility is also considered.    
The inability to control for country specific unobserved effects and the time invariant 
nature of the indices over a period that witnessed substantial change is the main limit of 
the exercise. The effort made by the authors to instrument for regulation itself and the 
fact that they allow for an interaction with the quality of governance are two attractive 
features, together with the focus on a sample including developing countries.
 28 
  The results suggest a negative and significant direct effect of product (and labor) 
market regulation on growth, but the coefficient  of the interaction with governance is 
significant (except for the fiscal burden index), and its sign suggests that  better 
governance reduces the negative effect of regulation. Actually, the size of the coefficients 
are such that the overall effect of regulation is sizeable and negative for most developing 
countries, while it is zero or even mildly positive for countries with quality of governance 
similar to the US and the UK  (and presumably other OECD countries). The results for 
macroeconomic volatility are similar: regulation increases volatility, but the effect is 
                                                 
28 Legal origin, fraction of the population that speaks a major European language and initial per capita GDP 
are used as instruments. The test of over-identifying restrictions does not suggest misspecification. 
Concerns about the power of such test should, however, not be forgotten.   36
attenuated by good governance. Note that these results, obtained by introducing the 
interaction with governance, contrast with those that find a positive effect of product 
market reform on growth for industrial countries.  
  Griffith and Harrison (2004) also present evidence for the effect of regulation on 
productivity for developed countries, using their two step approach, where the 
intermediate link is the mark-up. When the level or the growth rate of labor or total factor 
productivity in the business sector is regressed on the mark-up (the latter instrumented by 
the regulatory variables) they tend to find a positive and significant effect of the mark-up 
on both the level and growth rate of productivity.  The conclusion that a higher mark-up  
has a mostly positive effect on productivity is not altered by allowing for non linear 
effects of the mark-up or by the direct inclusion of  some regulation indices in the 
regression. Taken at face value, these results are consistent with the idea that monopoly 
rents provide the crucial incentive for productivity enhancing innovative activity. An 
alternative explanation is that the new jobs created by deregulation are in lower 
productivity sectors. Note in this respect that the mark-up coefficient is negative and 
larger in absolute value in the service sector. An alternative explanation is that the time 
period available for estimation does not allow one to capture the complexity of the 
relationship between mark-up and productivity. For instance, the new firms that enter 
following a reduction in regulation may be initially less productive than incumbent 
surviving firms and it may take time for them to achieve higher levels of productivity. It 
is interesting to note that the positive relationship comes from the within variation in the 
data. If one does not include country dummies in the regression, allowing the between   37
variation to play a role as well, the relationship between mark-up and productivity tends 
to become negative and significant. 
Cincera and Galgau (2005) present results on the effect of entry and exit on output 
growth and labor productivity growth instrumented with regulation and other variables.  
Note that the coefficient of entry does not capture only the direct effect of entry on 
productivity, but also the indirect effect that entry has on the productivity of existing 
firms.  There is some evidence at the 10% level that entry has a positive effect on labor 
productivity growth, while exit has a significant positive effect on it at the 5% level.  
  Loayza et al (2005), use a similar two steps approach to explain labor productivity 
growth in manufacturing for their subset of developed and developing countries, using 
turnover (divided by the standard deviation of terms of trade growth) as the intermediate 
variable. Standardized turnover is interacted with the average US turnover and it is 
instrumented by product market regulation, labor regulation, and fiscal burden.  Average 
GDP per capita, the average growth rate of the terms of trade, and the output gap over the 
period are included as controls. Although the regulation variables are time invariant, so 
that the authors cannot control for unobserved heterogeneity, an interesting twist in their 
contribution is the decomposition of  productivity growth into the “within” component, 
the “between” component and a component  representing the portion of productivity 
growth due to entry and exit. A specification in which each regulatory variable is 
included directly in the productivity equations is also estimated by OLS. The overall 
results suggest that the portion of turnover explained by business regulation flexibility 
has a positive and significant effect on overall labor productivity growth. However, the 
only component that is significantly affected is its net entry component.   38
  In summary, most of the studies that include measures of regulation directly in the 
regression (alone or interacted) tend to find a negative effect of tighter regulation on total 
factor productivity or per capita output growth. The results for TFP growth are strong 
particularly in the service sectors, while the effect on the level of governance on growth 
needs to be investigated further. However, studies that use the mark-up as the channel of 
transmission find that decreases in the mark-up associated with deregulation are 
associated with lower productivity growth (or level).
29 Controlling for the mark-up, there 
is no evidence of an additional positive direct effect of deregulation on productivity 
(sometimes the opposite is the case). The cross-sectional dimension of the data suggests 
that countries with higher mark-ups have lower productivity growth rates, but one has to 
be aware that in this case we are not controlling for other country effects besides their 
competitive environment. On balance, relying on turnover or entry as the variable 
through which the effect of  deregulation is transmitted suggests a positive effect of 
lowering regulatory  burdens on overall productivity growth, but more work is needed in 
order to understand how that is distributed between the within, between and entry/exit 
components. The general conclusion that can be drawn at this point is that most, but not 
all, the evidence points towards a positive effect of less stringent regulation on 
productivity growth.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusions  
 
What are the overall lessons that can be derived from this review of the available 
cross-country evidence on the effect of product market regulation?  We have certainly 
                                                 
29 Note that higher mark-ups are associated also with more R&D spending.   39
learned a lot from the recent econometric work in this area, but there is still ambiguity on 
some of the issues.  
There is considerable evidence that product market regulation that raises barriers 
to entry contributes to higher mark-ups. Moreover, the results support the conclusion that 
regulatory barriers in the product market have a negative effect on firm entry or turnover 
and are likely to slow the process of reallocation of resources.  
As far as factor accumulation is concerned the direct evidence and the indirect 
one via effects on the mark-up suggest a positive effect of  product market deregulation 
on investment and employment in the service sector. The result for investment is 
particularly important because often new processes are embodied in new capital goods 
and find their way into the economic systems through the investment process. For 
manufacturing there is no evidence of a positive (or for that matter, negative) effect, 
although that may be the result of lack of adequate sector specific and time varying 
measures of regulation. Entry does not seem to be a key channel through which changes 
in regulation affect the demand for labor and capital, although there is clear evidence that 
entry responds strongly to the regulatory climate. The effect of entry on the reallocation 
of factors of production requires additional investigation. 
  The cross-country studies are not supportive, at this stage, of a strong positive 
effect of less stringent regulation on direct input measures of firms’ innovative activities. 
Actually, the studies that use the mark-up as the transmission mechanism find that lower 
mark-ups discourage innovation. However, this result is sensitive to the choice of the 
sample of countries used in estimation. There is, instead, some evidence that non-tariff 
barriers have a negative effect on R&D. The results based on the mark-up are at odds   40
with some recent micro evidence for individual countries on the existence of an inverted 
U shaped relationship between the mark-up and firms’ innovative activities. Clearly, 
more work is needed to resolve the theoretical ambiguities concerning the effect of 
product market regulation on firms’ innovative activity and to come to more definitive 
conclusions on this issue. Progress in this area depends upon the availability of cross-
country data on firm’s innovative activities that go beyond R&D spending, such as patent 
counts, measures of firm’s innovative investment, survey measures on the introduction of 
innovations, etc. It also requires a deeper understanding of how the nature of a country’s 
industrial structure, the distance of a country from the technological frontier, the 
availability of human capital, and other initial conditions may lead to different results.  
  Finally, most of the studies that include measures of regulation directly in the 
regression (alone or interacted) tend to find a negative effect of tighter regulation on total 
factor productivity or per capita output growth. This cross-country evidence is consistent 
with the micro-econometric evidence that finds a positive and significant association 
between competition and productivity growth. These results are not confirmed by studies 
that use the mark-up as the channel of transmission, since in that case a decreases in the 
mark-up following deregulation is associated with lower productivity growth (or level). 
Relying on entry or turnover as the variable through which the effect of  deregulation is 
transmitted suggests a positive effect of lowering regulatory  burdens on overall 
productivity growth, but more work is needed in order to understand exactly how that is 
distributed between the within, between and entry/exit components.  The general 
conclusion that can be drawn at this point is that most, but not all, the evidence points 
towards a positive effect of less stringent regulation on productivity growth.   41
  This result is very important on its own, but also has an interesting consequence 
on a macro variable that has not been the focus of our survey, namely inflation. The faster 
rate of productivity growth associated with less stringent product market regulation 
reduces, ceteris paribus, inflationary pressure. In addition, if we consider the evidence 
that lower regulatory barriers lead to a smaller mark-up, it follows that regulatory reform 
may have favorable effects on inflation at short as well as longer horizons. Further 
systematic evidence on this issue would be very useful.
30 
  There is another important topic for future research. As we have mentioned in the 
introduction, many countries have introduced reforms that affect not only the output 
market, but also the labor market and the financial sector. It is important to investigate 
how the effect of product market reform depends upon the rules and regulations in the 
labor market, upon the regulatory structure and level of development of the financial 
sector, and upon other institutional features of a country. Progress in this area will 





                                                 
30 See Neiss (2001) for cross sectional evidence on the relationship between the mark-up and inflation in 
OECD countries and Cavelaars  (2002) for an cross sectional  analysis of the effect of product market 
regulation.   42
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